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I.  INTRODUCTION: FREE RADIO SAN DIEGO 
Free Radio San Diego (FRSD) broadcasted on 96.9 FM and served the 
San Diego area beginning in October 2002.1  Locally owned and operated, 
FRSD’s listeners preferred the station’s diverse programming to heavy 
rotation, commercial-filled2 corporate radio alternatives.3  On the morning 
of July 21, 2005, station fans expected to hear FRSD founder and 
morning DJ “Bob Ugly”4 talking local politics, playing commercial-free 
rock music, or rallying support for the upcoming “San Diego Day” 
picnic.  Unfortunately, at 9:51 a.m., FRSD’s signal abruptly cut out and never 
returned.5  Listeners logging on to the FRSD Web site were similarly 
unable to listen to the show’s streaming Internet simulcast.  The station’s 
service was silenced. 
Free Radio San Diego’s July 21 broadcast disruption came courtesy of 
an early morning, unannounced Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) raid on FRSD headquarters.  Armed with an in rem arrest warrant 
and accompanied by U.S. Marshals, FCC agents stormed FRSD’s 
apartment broadcasting location, disassembled their antennae, and seized 
 1. Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, About Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM (Aug. 4, 
2004), http://www.pirate969.org/ (select About FRSD) (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
 2. Studies show that twelve to sixteen minutes of every hour are filled by 
commercials on most radio stations.  Daniel J. Rapela, An Analysis of the Effects of 
Consolidation on the Radio Industry (Dec. 2, 1999) (unpublished thesis, Gannon 
University) available at http://mmstudio.gannon.edu/~gabriel/rapela.html (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2006). 
 3. Other San Diego stations playing similar mixes of pop, punk, and rock music 
include Rock 105.3 (KIOZ-FM) and Classic Rock 101 KGB (KGB FM).  Clear Channel, 
http://www.clearchannel.com/Radio/StationSearch.aspx (search San Diego) (last visited 
June 21, 2006).  Each of these stations is owned by Clear Channel Communications, a 
media conglomerate controlling nine stations in San Diego, id., and over 1200 stations 
across the United States.  Clear Channel Radio Sales, http://www.clearchannelradiosales. 
com/About.html (last visited June 21, 2006).  Another alternative rock station, FM 94.9, 
is owned by Lincoln Financial Media, a large media company owning three radio stations in 
San Diego and over twenty media outlets in the United States.  Lincoln Financial Media, 
http://www. lincolnfinancialmedia.com/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). 
 4. “Bob Ugly” is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the station operator.  
See, e.g., Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, http://www.pirate969.org/ (select FAQ). 
 5. This Author, listening to 96.9 FM on the morning in question, noted the time 
the station ceased operating. 
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computers and transmitting equipment.6  Despite open bandwidth and a 
loyal audience, FRSD did not possess an FCC license to broadcast on 
96.9 MHz.  Lacking a license, Bob Ugly, a so-called pirate radio broadcaster, 
operated against a regulatory backdrop allowing the FCC to seize and 
forfeit broadcasting equipment, imprison station managers, or both.7  
Coming on the heels of occasional FCC notices, Bob Ugly himself 
expected a formal confrontation with the FCC sooner or later.8  But 
before he could confront the FCC in court, FRSD’s broadcasting 
equipment was seized and forfeited to the United States Government. 
At the heart of the FRSD seizure is a statute giving the United States 
ownership over the entire natural spectrum usable for radio transmission.9  
The surrounding regulatory framework provides that private parties 
wishing to transmit information over the spectrum must do so with the 
blessing of an FCC license.10  Despite Bob Ugly’s best efforts, he was 
unable to obtain the requisite license to broadcast.11  Undaunted, he 
 6. Joe Hughes & Frank Green, Agents Raid, Shut Down Unlicensed Free Radio, 
SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 22, 2005, at B1. 
 7. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (2000). 
 8. Kelly Davis, No License, No Problem: Pirate Radio Station Plans to 
Rebuild After Raid, SAN DIEGO CITY BEAT, July 27, 2005, available at http://www. 
sdcitybeat.com/article.php?id=3391 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).  In an interview with 
San Diego City Beat a few weeks before the FCC raid took place, Bob Ugly commented 
that FRSD staged a benefit concert to raise money for replacement equipment “when 
[the FCC decides] to greet us with a battering ram.”  Scoop Stevens, Locals Only: 
Notes from the Local Music Scene, SAN DIEGO CITY BEAT, June 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.sdcitybeat.com/ article.php?id=3300 (last visited Oct. 15, 2006). 
 9. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
 10. Id.  This power is based in the Commerce Clause, even though radio station 
signals often do not reach across state lines.  See United States v. Ganley, 300 F. Supp. 
2d 200, 202 (D. Me. 2004) (rejecting this federalism-based argument where the station’s 
transmission was limited to one state).  The Supreme Court has held that all radio signals 
are interstate by nature.  Fisher’s Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm’n, 297 U.S. 650, 
655 (1936).  Given the Court’s recent Commerce Clause analysis in Gonzales v. Raich, 
125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005), further federalism attacks on § 301 are likely to be futile. 
 11. Bob Ugly has chronicled his efforts to obtain a low power license to broadcast 
in the San Diego area.  See Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, supra note 1.  Using the 
FCC’s Web-based “Channel Finder” and typing in the coordinates for FRSD’s original 
Golden Hill broadcasting site, the Channel Finder returns information that the 
coordinates “cannot be used to apply for a low power broadcast station on ANY FM 
channel due to interference caused to authorized FM broadcast stations.  As a result, an 
application for this site for a [Low Power FM] station cannot be accepted for 
processing.”  Id.  Bob Ugly wryly notes that, despite the claim of potential interference, 
the FCC had no problem granting Global Radio, Inc. airtime on 96.9 MHz during the 
Super Bowl.  See id.; FCC Grants “Experimental FM Application” for Super Bowl, 560 
THE CGC COMMUNICATOR, Feb. 4, 2003, http://www.bext.com/CGC/2003/cgc560.htm. 




found a slice of open radio spectrum and started broadcasting anyway.  
Although his broadcasts did not interfere with licensed broadcasters, 
Bob Ugly and those like him who do not, or cannot, receive a 
broadcasting license break federal law and risk having their equipment 
seized and forfeited to the United States without prior judicial notice.12  
Despite these risks, pirate radio operators perceive a need for 
community-oriented broadcasting and establish unlicensed stations in 
communities across the United States.13  For FRSD, the local reaction 
thus far had been overwhelmingly positive: listener donations kept the 
station afloat, and the station had never received any complaints, official 
or otherwise, about interference or programming.14  In establishing 
FRSD, Bob Ugly dreamed of providing his community with a locally 
oriented, commercial-free alternative to mainstream radio; he did not set 
out to chance a felony conviction and lose thousands of dollars worth of 
broadcasting equipment.15
As applied to non-interfering pirate broadcasters like FRSD, enforcing 
licensing requirements with ex parte forfeiture conflicts with current 
FCC regulatory theory and Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Congress has 
authorized the FCC to use the Supplemental Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Admiralty, and Maritime Rules16 to seize property of suspected pirate 
radio operators.17  Succinctly, a one-sided18 showing of probable cause 
that a radio operator transmits without a license19 allows the government 
 12. Congress authorized the United States to broadly seize “[a]ny electronic, 
electromagnetic, radio-frequency, or similar device, or component thereof, used, sent, 
carried, manufactured, assembled, possessed, offered for sale, sold, or advertised with 
willful and knowing intent to violate section 301 or 302a of this title . . . .”  47 U.S.C.     
§ 510. 
 13. Michael Aguilar, Note, Micro Radio: A Small Step in the Return to Localism, 
Diversity, and Competitiveness in Broadcasting, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1133, 1169 (1999). 
 14. Interview by KPBS Radio’s Tom Fudge with Bob Ugly, Program Director and 
DJ at Free Radio San Diego, and Dennis Wharton, Senior VP of Corporate 
Communications for the National Association of Broadcasters, in San Diego, California. 
(July 28, 2005), available at http://stream.publicbroadcasting.net/production/mp3/kpbs/ 
local-kpbs-478387.mp3 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Tom Fudge Interview]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. The Supplemental Rules were originally promulgated to satisfy maritime liens.  
Due to the inherent exigencies involved, the Supplemental Rules provide less procedural 
due process than otherwise provided by normal civil forfeiture law.  Gregory C. 
Buffalow, The Annotated Rules B and C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty 
and Maritime Claims, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 543, 543-
44 (2002). 
 17. 47 U.S.C. § 510. 
 18. Black’s Law Dictionary defines ex parte as: “Done or made at the instance and 
for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person 
adversely interested . . . .”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 616 (8th ed. 2004). 
 19. FED. R. CIV. P. C(2) allows seizure for violations of federal statutes.  
Broadcasting without a license violates 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
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to silence the broadcast by seizing the offending property.20  Although 
most courts disfavor no-notice seizures,21 the FCC uses the 
Supplemental Rules to seize personal property without showing “exigent 
 20. Accordingly, the typical pirate radio raid does not seek to arrest pirate radio 
broadcasters.  Rather, the seizure constitutes an important step in an in rem action 
designed to silence broadcasting through forfeiture of the instrumentalities alleged to 
violate the law.  See 47 U.S.C. § 510.  Notice is not required, and the government may 
obtain a writ of entry and arrest warrant upon a showing of probable cause.  See id.; see, 
e.g., United States v. One (1) 1966 Beechcraft Baron, No. N242BS, 788 F.2d 384, 387 
(6th Cir. 1986) (describing the probable cause standard for governmental forfeitures).  
Typically, the government demonstrates probable cause by submitting a verified 
complaint accompanied by an engineer’s affidavit alleging violations of 47 U.S.C. § 301, 
the statute requiring a license to broadcast.  FED. R. CIV. P. C(4), (6); see, e.g., United 
States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 218 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 
2000) (establishing probable cause by filing a complaint accompanied by engineer 
Viglione’s affidavit which alleged 47 U.S.C. § 301 violations); United States v. Any & 
All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (establishing 
violations through the “Loginow Affidavit”).  These instances deal with establishing 
probable cause at trial.  Technically, under the Supplemental Rules, the clerk of the court 
must issue a warrant in response to a verified complaint alleging a violation of a federal 
statute.  FED. R. CIV. P. C(3)(a)(i).  In practice, however, the government will usually use 
affidavits establishing probable cause and get the arrest warrant signed by a magistrate 
judge.  The verified complaint is filed under seal and, unlike most civil forfeiture 
proceedings, exigent circumstances need not be shown.  Id. 
Armed with a writ of entry and in rem arrest warrant, U.S. Marshals and FCC agents 
raid the suspected broadcasting location and seize the equipment.  Typically, these raids 
are carried out with minor disruption of the public peace.  However, local opinion often 
runs with the pirate operators and against government interference in what the 
community views as a valuable public service.  For example, sixty protesters contributed 
to a tense operation when the FCC raided Free Radio Santa Cruz and FCC vehicles had 
to be towed from the scene after their tires were slashed.  Cathy Redfern, Pirate Radio 
Station Unplugged, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL, Sept. 30, 2004, available at http://www. 
santacruzsentinel.com/archive/2004/September/30/local/stories/01local.htm (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2006). 
After seizure, the Rules mandate publication of notice and require parties claiming an 
interest in the property to file a statement of interest before filing an answer.  FED. R. 
CIV. P. C(4), (6).  Assuming that the pirate radio operator/claimant timely files his 
statement of interest and answer, new hurdles surface once he appears in court to contest 
the forfeiture.  For example, some courts employing the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
refuse jurisdiction over a claimant’s defenses if based on constitutional grounds.  See 
United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 2000) (maintaining that these 
challenges can only be brought in a Court of Appeals following an FCC order).  As 
explained in Part IV, the primary jurisdiction doctrine is a significant roadblock for 
pirate operators who wish to challenge the regulatory scheme.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 157-59. 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 
896, 903-04 (2d. Cir. 1992) (noting the potential for government abuse of ex parte 
seizure, such as a “dry run” to test the strength of a potential criminal conviction). 




circumstances” like interference complaints or safety hazards.22  The 
practice warrants a critical look that considers the core regulatory functions 
of the FCC, a changed media landscape, and evolving Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. 
Part II of this Comment describes how FCC regulatory policy has 
shifted from the “public trust” model to a privately driven approach.  Ex 
parte seizure of non-interfering pirate radio equipment does not match 
current FCC regulatory theory and works against traditional “public 
interest” factors.  Part III analyzes new FCC policy towards Low Power 
FM and suggests that the Supreme Court develop fresh precedent to 
keep pace.  Part IV addresses Fourth Amendment concerns by exploring 
alternate enforcement methods and proposing more reasonable 
approaches to license enforcement.  Finally, Part V analyzes the Due 
Process implications of ex parte seizures under the Supreme Court’s 
Mathews23 framework.  Under Parts IV and V, the emergence of dual 
use technology has made ex parte seizure a riskier play from the 
government’s perspective. 
II.  THE FCC’S REGULATORY PEDIGREE 
A.  Government Spectrum Ownership and Early Regulation 
Radio first became popular in the early twentieth century as a safety 
feature for ships to communicate with each other.24  After amateur 
operators began interfering with business and government use, Congress 
passed the Radio Act of 1912, the first serious attempt to regulate the 
airwaves and ensure that radio developed into a useful medium.25  The 
 22. FED. R. CIV. P. C(3)(a)(i).  If the seizure is challenged, courts will analyze the 
seizure under the Supreme Court’s Mathews test.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334-35 (1976).  Most courts justify the seizure with an ex post determination that 
exigent circumstances did exist.  See infra Part V. 
 23. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
 24. Gregory M. Prindle, Note, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has 
Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 279, 284 (2003).  Even before the Radio Act of 1912, infra note 25, the 
Wireless Ship Act of 1910 forbade any steamer licensed or carrying more than fifty 
persons to leave port unless equipped with a radio and skilled operator.  Nat’l Broad. Co. 
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210 (1943). 
 25. Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302 (repealed in 1932).  Interestingly, the 
Act did not regulate radio stations operating entirely within the borders in one state, 
provided they did not interfere with interstate transmissions.  Id. at 302.  The Secretary’s 
first years under the Act were quiet: problems of interference arose infrequently because 
few radio operators broadcasted on an open spectrum.  See Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 
210.  World War I, however, accelerated the development of radio and the new media 
spread rapidly across America.  Id. at 210-11.  By 1925, there were almost six hundred  
radio stations across America and 175 applications for new stations.  Id. at 211. 
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Act accorded the Secretary of Commerce vague, undefined power to 
grant licenses regulating the frequencies, times, and locations of 
broadcasts.26  As the usable spectrum27 filled up, greater instances of 
interference sparked debate on which broadcaster had the right to be 
heard.  In 1926, courts and judicial officers became concerned about the 
Secretary of Commerce’s unbridled discretion to regulate these rights,28 
and the Act of 1912 was abandoned.  Without any legislation regulating 
the broadcast spectrum, chaos ensued as broadcasters transmitted 
indiscriminately across frequencies.29  Recognizing the great public 
value in radio, President Coolidge urgently recommended enactment of 
new legislation.30  The goal was to develop the broadcast spectrum into a 
communication medium useful for public and private information 
transmission. 
The Radio Act of 1927 created an administrative agency, the Federal 
Radio Commission (FRC), authorized to license and regulate radio in 
accordance with the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”31  Most 
significantly, the 1927 Act made clear what the 1912 legislation assumed: 
the government owned the broadcast spectrum, private ownership was 
impossible, and use of the spectrum could occur only with the 
government’s permission.32  Permission took the form of a license, 
 26. See 37 Stat. at 34. 
 27. The laws of nature limit the amount of information one can transmit through 
the air.  For a discussion of the technical and physical aspects of radio in layman’s terms, 
see Arthur Martin, Comment, Which Public, Whose Interest?  The FCC, the Public 
Interest, and Low-Power Radio, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1159, 1162-64 (2001). 
 28. Counterintuitively, the Secretary lacked the power to deny licenses.  See 
Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923),  However, with more 
prospective operators than available frequencies, the Secretary could control the power 
and operations of stations by ordering frequency sharing.  Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 
211.  After a federal court cast doubt on the Secretary’s nonreviewable discretion, 
Attorney General William Donovan denied the Secretary much of his presumed power of 
regulation.  See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926).  
See generally 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 126, 129-32 (1926).  Reviewing the enacting legislation, 
Donovan determined that Congress did not originally intend to delegate broad regulatory 
powers to the Secretary.  Id. at 129. 
 29. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 212.  Almost two hundred new radio stations 
went on the air, and indiscriminate frequency use across limited bandwidth led to interference 
and unintelligible broadcasts.  See id. 
 30. Id. (citing MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 
69-483, at 10 (2d Sess. 1926)). 
 31. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632-69, §4, 1162 Stat. 1163-64 (1927) 
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a)-(d), 309(a), 310, 312). 
 32. THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST 
PROGRAMMING 12 (1994).  Krattenmaker and Powe also state “[w]hen the Titanic sank 




granted for free, but for no more than three years.33  Although the 
comprehensive Communications Act of 1934 replaced the FRC with the 
modern-day FCC, most of the administrative agency’s regulatory 
functions and powers remained intact.34  For consistency, this Comment 
will always refer to the FCC though earlier analysis might actually refer 
to the FRC. 
B.  “Scarcity” Justifies Government Ownership and Regulation 
Once radio progressed past the developmental stage, two things 
became clear: (1) radio was a mass communications medium which 
could broadcast information ranging from military orders to baseball 
games over great distances;35 and (2) the laws of nature limited the 
number of usable frequencies.36  Two or more broadcasters transmitting 
on the same frequency created interference; that is, each message 
destructed the other and neither broadcaster could be heard intelligibly.37  
The term “scarcity” characterized this limitation and provided the historical 
basis for government ownership and regulation.38  If the number of 
broadcasters exceeded the scarce number of usable frequencies, certain 
broadcasters needed a recognized right of transmission to ensure radio 
remained a reliable means of communication.  After claiming absolute 
ownership over the broadcast spectrum, the government vested this right 
in some broadcasters by awarding a license. 
The Supreme Court’s National Broadcasting Corporation39 (NBC) 
decision acknowledged the scarcity rationale’s effects on the freedom of 
speech.40  Because of scarcity, the specter of debilitating interference 
justified government ownership of a medium used almost exclusively to 
communicate information.41  Although all mediums are scarce,42 radio 
[in 1912], the United States government seized control of the airwaves.”  Id. at 5.  The 
authors discuss the interference caused by amateur radio operators spreading rumors that 
prevented emergency information from reaching other vessels.  Id. 
 33. Id. at 12.  Licenses are no longer free.  If two people compete for a license, the 
FCC auctions the license to the highest bidder.  See Federal Communications 
Commission, About Auctions, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about 
auctions&page=1 (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). 
 34. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 
47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2000)). 
 35. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 5-7. 
 36. STAN GIBILISCO, HANDBOOK OF RADIO AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY 547-48 
(1999). 
 37. THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR 74 (1996). 
 38. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943). 
 39. Id. at 190. 
 40. See id. at 213. 
 41. Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First 
Amendment Violation, 52 DUKE L.J. 1, 31-32 (2002).  Benjamin sets up a number of 
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could not be efficiently exploited through private ownership because 
“ordinary individuals applying ordinary concepts could not understand 
how broadcasting operate[d] or control its consequences. . . .”43  Because of 
the spectrum’s unique qualities, utilizing this “government property” to 
transmit information carried concomitant restrictions on First Amendment 
rights.44  For the sake of reliability, the FCC could impose licensing 
restrictions on otherwise legal speech if the speaker wanted to disseminate 
his message over a complicated and scarce government resource. 
interesting hypotheticals which compare the regulation of radio spectrum to the 
regulation of newspapers.  Id. at 26-31.  To Benjamin, any radio regulation necessarily 
implicates the First Amendment because the radio spectrum is almost entirely used to 
communicate information.  Id. at 31.  The “spectrum” lacks an independent significance 
because it is only useful to send information from one point to another.  Id. at 31-32; cf. 
Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The “Public Interest” Standard: The Search for 
the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 610 (1997) (discussing the spectrum’s 
independent value as a “public resource” to be managed by “public trustees” 
broadcasting for the good of the community) (citing The Federal Radio Commission and 
the Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees,11 FED. COMM. B.J. 5, 14 
(1950)). 
 42. For example, one could not publish two newspapers on the same piece of paper 
without rendering both unreadable.  See Benjamin, supra note 41, at 40 (“Lower courts 
and scholars—and even the FCC at one point—have forcefully contended that the 
scarcity affecting spectrum is no different from the scarcity affecting newsprint or 
printing presses.”).  For example, printing presses are not subject to licensing 
requirements which determine who can and cannot publish.  Id. at 28.  From a First 
Amendment standpoint, information on the printed page receives constitutional protection 
while the same information transmitted over an unlicensed frequency does not. 
 43. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 35. 
 44. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 226.  Although Justice Frankfurter’s First 
Amendment discussion involves one paragraph of a forty-page opinion, id., the powerful 
language therein provides language necessary to rebuff freedom of speech arguments in 
pirate radio seizures.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 
218 F.3d 543, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Because [pirate operator] Perez does not have a 
First Amendment right to broadcast his views on an unlicensed radio station, this 
argument does not present a defense to forfeiture.”); U.S. v. Any & All Radio Station 
Transmission Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (similar).  Justice 
Frankfurter stated that “[t]he right of free speech does not include . . . the right to use the 
facilities of radio without a license.”  Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 227.  Finding that 
Congress accepted the scarcity rationale when enacting the Radio Act of 1927, Justice 
Frankfurter conceded that if Congress authorized the Commission to choose among 
applicants based upon political, economic, or social views, the issue would be “wholly 
different.”  Id. at 226.  Regardless, without a license providing First Amendment 
protection, any unlicensed broadcaster lost a formidable shield against government 
intrusion.  Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  In Pacifica, the Supreme 
Court upheld the FCC’s ability to prohibit licensed broadcasters from airing indecent 
language over radio.  See id. at 748-51. Constitutional Law expert Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky calls the result “troubling.”  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1000-01 (2d ed. 2002). 




Although critiques of the scarcity rationale date back at least forty-five 
years,45 scarcity provided a sufficient justification for government spectrum 
ownership in 1927.  Already an indispensable military intelligence tool,46 
the government then held the largest stake in developing reliable, orderly 
broadcasting as quickly as possible.47  As thousands of amateur broadcasters 
drifted across various frequencies, embroiling the government in common 
law disputes for every frequency violation would have been costly and 
inefficient.48  Since lay people, including judges,49 had trouble understanding 
the mechanics of radio transmission,50 applying common law property 
principles may not have produced consistent results.51  Because radio 
 45. Krattenmaker credits economist Ronald Coase as the first to examine the 
scarcity rationale’s holes.  KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 14.  The scarcity 
rationale’s critics argue that broadcasting’s unique characteristics justify regulation only 
inasmuch to preserve the technical integrity of radio.  Krattenmaker argues that any 
regulations, such as content regulations, falling outside technical regulations should be 
subject to First Amendment criticisms.  Id. at 55.  In other words, broadcasters should 
enjoy the same protections afforded to “publishers, street speakers, or performing 
artists.”  Id.  The FCC’s modern distancing from the scarcity doctrine to justify non-
technical, content-based regulations appears to lend these arguments some weight.  See 
Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 41, at 633 (“The FCC itself recognized by 1987 when 
it repealed the Fairness Doctrine that scarcity could no longer justify content 
regulation.”). 
 46. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 5-7. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Krattenmaker suggests that common law doctrines would have been 
inadequate because many state courts would be responsible for enforcing these doctrines.  
See id. at 17.  This presents a problem because most broadcasting crosses state lines.  See 
id.  Also, common law would soon have to differentiate between new technologies.  Id. 
at 16-17.  But see Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the 
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 149 (1990) (arguing that interference disputes 
were being adequately settled under the common law prior to government spectrum 
ownership).  Although Hazlett makes a good point for the common law settling private 
disputes, interference with official military transmissions arguably has higher 
consequences.  Reserving a guaranteed slice of spectrum for government use ensures that 
communiqués can always be heard in case of emergency or national security. 
 49. Justice Frankfurter wrote several of the early, important decisions upholding 
FCC regulations.  See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 190; FCC v. Pottsville Broad. 
Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).  His opinions set the tone for a broad mandate of regulatory 
power under the “public interest” standard, and his repeated references to the “rapid 
pace” of technical innovation characterize his great deference to FCC decisionmaking 
ability.  See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 29-31. 
 50. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 30-31, 34. 
 51. See supra note 48.  To this day, many credible arguments exist as to whether 
the radio spectrum is property unto itself, or nothing more than the information which it 
carries.  Benjamin insists that since the spectrum is only usable to transmit information, 
the property/speech distinction collapses back into itself.  See Benjamin, supra note 41, 
at 31-32.  That is, the spectrum only exists insofar as people use it to transmit 
information.  This has tremendous implications under First Amendment analysis, as 
purposefully keeping spectrum idle could be seen as stifling the flow of information 
otherwise transmissible on that spectrum.  See STREETER, supra note 37, at 219-22 
(discussing the difference between physical property constructions like streets and 
ethereal radio broadcasting); Benjamin, supra note 41, at 31-32.  For a comprehensive 
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was a booming though poorly understood technology, initial government 
ownership was necessary to protect important government interests and 
add some semblance of order to the radio dial.  Although imperfect, the 
scarcity rationale sufficiently justified spectrum ownership to ensure the 
new communication medium developed quickly and reliably. 
C.  Congress Appoints the FCC to Regulate in the “Public Interest” 
Once scarcity justified government ownership, congressional mandates 
allowed the FCC to manage the new property extensively.  Specifically, 
Congress broadly authorized the FCC to license and regulate broadcasters 
in accordance with the “public interest, convenience, or necessity.”52  
Critics have likened the vague “public interest” standard to a “blank 
check” of administrative power.53  Some even suggest the mandate violates 
the Nondelegation Doctrine.54  However, like the scarcity doctrine, the 
public interest mandate must be understood against its historical 
backdrop.  Early FCC public interest theory was similar to that underlying 
regulation of the nascent airline industry: to promote public appreciation, 
the government heavily regulated new technology at the expense of 
private interests.55  Because broadcasting’s technology was tough to 
grasp, an “expert commission” like the FCC needed broad discretion to 
oversee radio’s formative years.56  Like Congress, the Supreme Court 
also afforded the FCC much latitude in decisionmaking.  Fears of 
congressional and judicial meddling permeated early Court decisions, 
and nearly all FCC regulations were upheld under the public interest 
discussion of various property rights theories applied to the radio spectrum, see 
STREETER, supra note 37, at 219-55. 
 52. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  To date, Congress has directed or 
authorized the FCC to act in the public interest in nearly one hundred statutory 
provisions.  See Randolph May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate To 
Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427 app. A (2001). 
 53. See, e.g., KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 34. 
 54. See generally May, supra note 52. 
 55. For example, certain airlines were forced to fly unprofitable routes to ensure 
that cutthroat competition did not undermine the safety or economic stability of the 
industry.  Heavy regulation was one way of assuring that the industry operated 
efficiently and with the greatest good for the greatest number of Americans, although at 
the price of subverting the free market.  Asif Siddiqi, Air Transportation: Deregulation 
and Its Consequences, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Commercial_Aviation/ 
Dereg/Tran8.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2006). 
 56. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). 




standard.57  Over the last seventy years, the FCC has come to define the 
public interest standard as the promotion of competition, diversity, and 
localism in the marketplace.58
Early FCC doctrine eschewed private interests59 and treated the 
broadcast spectrum like a public utility.60  Licenses to communicate over 
the scarce public spectrum were free; however, heavy regulation ensured 
privileged licensees would operate in a manner benefiting the listening 
public.  When deciding which licenses should be renewed, the FCC 
looked anew at how listeners would benefit from fresh programming.61  
License incumbents received little protection; the fresh public interest 
determination did not account for “sunk costs” and the FCC would even 
award airtime to a competitor.62
The public trust theory, applied to radio regulation, was inherently 
democratic: using the spectrum to communicate advanced liberty by 
fostering an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” 63  The FCC thought the 
marketplace was best served by a diverse range of programming reflecting 
local broadcasters.  For example, fearing that network media consolidation64 
threatened the public interest, the FCC promulgated “Chain Broadcasting 
Regulations” in response to rising consolidation in station ownership.65  
These regulations promoted localism by, among other things, allowing 
 57. See generally id. at 145-46 (upholding FCC regulations against attack); Nat’l 
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-27 (1943) (same). 
 58. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 43; Jill K. Howard, Congress Errs 
in Deregulating Broadcast Ownership Caps, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 269 (1997). 
 59. See, e.g., KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. 
Cir. 1931) (denying licensing when broadcasting was used primarily for private profit). 
 60. Krasnow & Goodman, supra note 41, at 610. 
 61. See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 62 F.2d 850, 851-
52 (D.C. Cir. 1932) (holding the FRC’s denial of relicensing proper because the 
incumbent licensee did not operate his station in the public interest). 
 62. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940). 
 63. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); cf. Minneapolis 
Star v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (“[A]n informed public is 
the essence of a working democracy.”). 
 64. “Networks” were, and are, stations that engage in “chain broadcasting.”  As 
defined in § 3 of the Communications Act of 1934, chain broadcasting is the 
“simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations.”  
Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 n.1 (1943).  Examples of 
network media today include NBC, ABC, and CBS. 
 65. At the end of 1938, there were 660 commercial stations in the United States, of 
which 341 were affiliated exclusively with NBC.  Id. at 197.  Further, 102 stations were 
affiliated with the Columbia Broadcasting Company (CBS).  Id.  While consolidation 
brought wider services to more people, the Commission promulgating the Chain 
Broadcasting Regulations worried about the effect of consolidation on licensee’s 
“statutory duty of determining which programs would best serve the needs of their 
community.”  Id. at 199. 
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local stations to affiliate with multiple networks,66 limiting network 
ownership of stations,67 and enhancing the local affiliate’s ability to 
reject network programming.68  If a large corporation wished to profit 
from a smaller affiliate, FCC regulations ensured a degree of local 
station autonomy to best serve local markets.  The Supreme Court 
upheld these regulations in NBC,69 agreeing that local programming was 
 66. See id.  (discussing the FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting, Commission 
Order No. 37, Docket No. 5060 (1941)).  The Court stated that exclusive affiliation 
clauses deny station licensees the freedom to choose programs best suited to their needs 
and “in this matter the duty . . . to operate in the public interest is defeated.”  Id. 
 67. See id. at 206-07 (examining the Report on Chain Broadcasting’s finding that 
the “licensing of two stations in the same area to a single network organization is 
basically unsound and contrary to the public interest”). 
 68. The Supreme Court in NBC backed the Report on Chain Broadcasting and 
rejected the network practice of requiring local affiliates to object to network 
programming three weeks prior to broadcast.  From the “skeletal information” provided 
to affiliates about such broadcasts, the station had no way of knowing whether the 
programming fit the “public interest” or contained offensive material.  See id. at 204-05.  
Moreover, the local affiliate had the burden of proof showing a proposed replacement 
program better suited the public interest.  Id. 
 69. See generally Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 190.  Defending the Regulations’ 
broad reach, the Court drew upon prior decisions to reiterate the FCC’s power to control 
both the technical and substantive requirements of radio licensing.  The NBC Court cited 
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940), and Federal Radio Commission v. 
Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933), two earlier cases which emphasized and approved the 
broad congressional delegation to promote the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity” by fighting “monopolistic domination of the broadcasting field.”  Nat’l Broad. 
Co., 319 U.S. at 216-19.  Also, “[t]he avowed aim of the Communications Act of 1934 
was to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States.  To 
that end Congress endowed the Communications Commission with comprehensive 
powers to promote and realize the vast potentialities of radio.”  Id. at 217.  Justice 
Frankfurter then emphasized the dynamic and fluid nature of the broadcasting industry: 
[Overly specific Congressional regulations] would have stereotyped the 
powers of the [FCC] to specific details in regulating a field of enterprise the 
dominant characteristic of which was the rapid pace of its unfolding.  And so 
Congress did what experience had taught it in similar attempts at regulation, 
even in fields where the subject matter of regulation was far less fluid and 
dynamic than radio.  The essence of that experience was to define broad areas 
for regulation and to establish standards for judgment adequately related in 
their application to the problems to be solved. 
Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added).  Justice Frankfurter also unhesitatingly affirmed the 
broad authority delegated to the FCC to regulate in the “public interest”: 
True enough, the Act does not explicitly say that the Commission shall have 
power to deal with network practices found inimical to the public interest.  But 
Congress was acting in a field of regulation which was both new and dynamic.  
“Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear that in the absence of 
government control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic 
domination in the broadcasting field.”  In the context of the developing 




a “vital part of community life.”70  Thus, the listening public’s interest 
subordinated private profits, and heavy government regulation capped 
the growth potential of private broadcasters. 
Analyzing the now defunct “fairness doctrine” illustrates how early 
public interest policies focused on the listening public’s, rather than the 
broadcaster’s, interest in diversity.  The fairness doctrine required that 
radio and television licensees give adequate coverage to significant 
public issues by ensuring fair coverage that accurately presented conflicting 
views.71  For example, if the XYZ Network sold Person A ten minutes of 
airtime in which Person A attacked Person B’s reputation, fairness 
required XYZ provide Person B with ten minutes to respond.72  If Person 
B was unavailable or unable to afford ten minutes, XYZ needed to air B’s 
views at their own cost and initiative.73  Because a license carried a 
corresponding “public trustee” responsibility, abiding by regulations like 
the fairness doctrine significantly intruded upon broadcasters’ private 
rights to profit and freely select services. 
Under the old public trust model, ex parte seizure of a non-interfering 
pirate broadcaster’s equipment may have been appropriate.  The first 
problems to which it was directed, the Act gave the Commission not niggardly 
but expansive powers. . . .  [A] comprehensive mandate to “encourage the larger 
and more effective use of radio in the public interest,” . . . by making “special 
regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting.” 
Id. at 218-19 (citations omitted).  Throughout the opinion, Justice Frankfurter referenced 
and applied the evidentiary findings of the FCC’s Report on Chain Broadcasting without 
reservation.  See generally id. at 193-227. 
Naturally, the Court’s role is to faithfully interpret the laws, not to critique the policies 
thereof.  See id. at 218 (“We would be asserting our personal views regarding the 
effective utilization of radio were we to deny that the Commission was entitled to find 
that the large public aims of the Communications Act of 1934 comprehend the 
considerations which moved the Commission in promulgating the Chain Broadcasting 
Regulations.”).  Justice Frankfurter also withheld judgment on the Regulations’ affects 
on furthering the public interest, commenting that if NBC thinks “that the regulations are 
unwise, that they are not likely to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission 
intended, we can say only that the appellants have selected the wrong forum for such a 
plea.”  Id. at 224.  Citing Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 548 (1942), 
Justice Frankfurter wrote “[w]e certainly have neither technical competence nor legal 
authority to pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken by the Commission.  Our 
duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was based upon 
findings supported by evidence . . . .”  Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 224. 
Justice Frankfurter concluded his NBC analysis with a ringing endorsement of the 
FCC: “If time and changing circumstances reveal that the ‘public interest’ is not served 
by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in 
accordance with its statutory obligations.”  Id. at 225. 
 70. Id. at 203. 
 71. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 32, at 238-39. 
 72. See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-86 (1969) 
(discussing the fairness doctrine’s origins and reaffirming the FCC’s authority to 
regulate pursuant to the doctrine). 
 73. See id. at 383. 
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fifty years of broadcasting were characterized by two things: (1) a heavy 
regulatory footprint; and (2) listener-oriented regulations favoring 
diversity and localism at the expense of private broadcaster profits.  
Because developing the complex industry required heavy government 
regulation, the public interest in the scheme’s integrity would outweigh 
the private interest in unlicensed broadcasting.  Policies like the fairness 
doctrine already placed significant restrictions on broadcasters’ ability to 
operate without government intrusion.  Moreover, the public counted on 
the regulatory scheme’s ability to deliver diverse and local programming.  
Ex parte seizure of non-interfering pirate radio equipment would provide 
appropriate punishment for broadcasters posing as “public trustees” 
without official administrative approval.  Because licenses carried significant 
responsibilities to advance listener interests, transmitting in defiance of 
articulated public interest standards would constitute a public harm 
punishable by the agency.  As the next section illustrates, the FCC policy 
shift towards a marketplace theory significantly removes the government’s 
presence in the broadcasting industry.  Ex parte seizure of non-interfering 
pirate radio equipment may not be justified in a regulatory environment 
now premised on private interests. 
D.  Deregulation: The Government Takes a Less Active Role 
In marked contrast to prior policy, current FCC regulation has shifted 
from a public trust model to a privately driven approach.  Starting in the 
early 1980s, deregulation ceded greater power to private interests by 
relaxing radio ownership restrictions.74  Congress approved the most 
 74. In 1984, the national ownership cap was raised to twelve AM stations 
and twelve FM stations nationally.  See Prindle, supra note 24, at 295.  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed local ownership rules and eliminated the 
national ownership cap altogether.  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, § 202(a), 110 Stat. 56, 110-11.  The FCC assumed that the public interest in 
diversity would benefit through the efficiencies gained in consolidation. 
 [P]olicies that may have been necessary in the early days of radio may not be 
necessary in an environment where thousands of licensees offer diverse sorts 
of programming and appeal to all manner of segmented audiences. . . . 
. . . . 
We believe that given conditions in the radio industry, it is time to heed that 
sentiment and to reduce the regulatory role played by Commission policies and 
rules, and to permit the discipline of the marketplace to play a more prominent 
role.  It is our conclusion that the regulations that we are retaining and the 
functioning of the marketplace will result in service in the public interest that 




significant deregulation through the Telecommunications Act of 1996,75 
and the FCC further relaxed ownership restrictions in 2003.76  Besides 
is more adaptable to changes in consumer preferences and at less financial cost 
and with less regulatory burden. 
In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 969, 1014 (1981). 
 75. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934)). 
 76. Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).  The FCC justified its 2003 deregulation order on decreased 
scarcity, or increased amounts of diverse information available to the consumer.  See id. 
at 46,291.  Critics argue the rationale is problematic because the FCC assumes greater 
modes of media communication adequately substitute for those squeezed out of existing 
mediums: 
The FCC’s assumption that non-broadcast media can serve as equal substitutes 
for traditional broadcast channels faces significant difficulty.  Broadcasters 
occupy a unique place in our culture.  Broadcast content is pervasive, popular, 
responsive and valuable.  For these reasons, non-broadcast [for example, 
Internet] media are unlikely to fulfill the same needs for the viewing public. 
Aaron Perzanowski, Note, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC: The Persistence of 
Scarcity, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 743, 760 (2005). 
Although consumers use new mediums like Internet, cable, and satellite services, 
scarcity still persists in the broadcast spectrum.  Perzanowski argues scarcity persists 
because broadcast media remains an attractive and cheap source of entertainment and 
information.  Id. at 760-61.  For example, nearly every home and car in America has a 
radio, and the value of broadcast stations remains very high.  “If Internet sites, for 
example, served as equal substitutes for broadcast stations, we should expect to see 
station owners abandoning their expensive broadcast enterprises and adopting a low cost 
Internet-only media strategy.”  Id. 
Accepting the FCC’s “decreased scarcity” rationale also raises different questions 
concerning the First Amendment and intrusiveness of FCC enforcement.  One critic 
argues that, “where scarcity is not present, the government’s regulatory authority 
correspondingly decreases.”  Enrique Armijo, Public Airwaves, Private Mergers: Analyzing 
the FCC’s Faulty Justifications for the 2003 Media Ownership Rule Changes, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 1482, 1490 (2004).  Specifically, the FCC statute authorizing swift and intrusive ex 
parte civil forfeiture necessarily infers a high degree of scarcity.  47 U.S.C. § 510(b) 
(2000).  For example, a pirate broadcaster interfering with a licensed radio station or air 
traffic controller illustrates radio’s inherent limits and justifies a rapid remedy.  One 
cannot argue this type of pirate broadcasting deserves First Amendment protection when 
public safety or the licensed rights of others are at risk. 
If one accepts the FCC’s premise that decreased scarcity permits decreased 
government involvement, a pirate radio operator posing no interference threat deserves 
different First Amendment analysis.  Comparing Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241, 258 (1974) with Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) illustrates 
this point.  In 1974, the Tornillo Court struck down a variation of Red Lion’s “fairness 
doctrine” as applied to print media.  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.  Although the Court did 
not reference Red Lion or scarcity, Tornillo provided more First Amendment protection 
from government regulation to newspaper publishers than broadcasters.  CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 44, at 1130-31.  Though not explicit in the Court’s reasoning, it may be that 
broadcast media’s comparatively greater scarcity warrants greater government intrusion 
than print media.  But see id. (raising this contention and arguing that there are, in fact, 
more broadcasters than newspapers).  Therefore, if the FCC finds less scarcity in 
broadcast media, reduced governmental intrusion in broadcast media should follow.  
This should apply across the board, from the front end of license application to the back 
end of licensing enforcement. 
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eliminating ownership restrictions, the FCC also rejected many content-
based policies like the fairness doctrine.77  Although the government 
maintained ownership over the broadcast spectrum, private parties could 
now broadcast with greater freedom from government intervention.  The 
current licensing scheme also reflects free market motives: the FCC now 
auctions licenses to the highest bidder instead of awarding free licenses 
based on “public interest” considerations.78
Throughout the deregulation process, critics railed against deregulation’s 
effects on the radio industry.  Because deregulation is premised on 
sufficient competition within a marketplace, abrupt deregulation could 
result in large-scale consolidation and anti-competitive behavior which 
would harm traditional public interest goals like localism and diversity.79  
Although the radio industry has in fact experienced massive 
consolidation,80 measurable gains in certain qualities of service have 
been recorded.81
FCC deregulation and the 1996/2003 legislation represented significant 
government withdrawals from many areas of the broadcast industry.  
 77. The FCC repealed the doctrine administratively, finding that the fairness 
doctrine chilled speech by acting as a “tax” on airing controversial issues.  In re 
Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 
5043 (1987).  The D.C. Circuit found the repeal of the fairness doctrine was supported 
by the “public interest” mandate.  Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 666-69 
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990). 
 78. See Federal Communications Commission, supra note 33. 
 79. See Prindle, supra note 24, at 298; Howard, supra note 58, at 278 (“It is a 
presumptive leap of logic . . . to conclude that increased competition warrants complete 
abandonment of national ownership caps which have existed for over half a century.”). 
 80. As predicted, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 resulted in large scale radio 
consolidation.  While the number of radio stations increased by 5.4%, the number of 
owners decreased by 33.6%.  George Williams & Scott Roberts, Radio Industry Review 
2002: Trends in Ownership, Format, and Finance, FCC (Sept., 2002), http://hraunfoss. 
fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A20.doc (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).  
Before the Act’s passage, the two largest radio stations owned 115 stations.  Today, they 
own over 1400.  William Safire, On Media Giantism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at A19.  
In most metropolitan markets, the two largest firms average 74% of the market’s 
advertising revenue.  Williams & Roberts, supra. 
 81. For example, larger companies now have more resources to extend to their 
news departments.  Steve Knoll, Radio Station Consolidation: Good News for Owners, 
But What About Listeners?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1996, at D5.  Theoretically, better 
news services better inform the listening public and further democracy.  See Minneapolis 
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (“[A]n 
informed public is the essence of working democracy”).  The Broadcast Ownership 
Rules also cite studies showing that consolidated stations better share resources and earn 
higher ratings.  68 Fed. Reg. 46,286; 46,313 (Aug. 5, 2003). 




The deregulation, premised on marketplace theory, assumed that profit-
minded competition would best fulfill the “public interest principles of 
competition, diversity, and localism.”82  The efficiencies gained by 
eliminating ownership caps were intended to allow network broadcasters 
to offer higher quality services to greater numbers of people.83
Marketplace theory tweaks the traditional meaning of competition in 
the public interest definition.  Although the old public interest regulations 
promoted competition within the radio industry,84 deregulation’s stated 
goal was to make the radio industry more competitive with new information 
mediums.85  For example, it was thought less regulated formats like Internet 
and satellite had been drawing audiences away from radio.86  Instead of 
losing listeners with government structured programming, a privately driven 
market could better respond to audience tastes.  Greater profits could make 
radio more attractive, and broadcasters could draw customers away from 
computer screens and satellite dishes. 
Although the radio industry has become more competitive, traditional 
public interest goals like localism and diversity have suffered.87  Massive 
radio consolidation with few or no new entrants into the industry implies 
that listeners receive information from fewer sources.  These fewer 
sources are larger, national networks buying up competing broadcasters 
and replacing local services with economies of scale.88  The resulting 
decreases in localism and diversity stand at odds with early FCC public 
interest policy as well as Supreme Court policy developed in support of 
early FCC regulation.89  Most non-interfering pirate broadcasters fulfill 
 82. See Prindle, supra note 24, at 297. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at 297-98. 
 84. For instance, the NBC Chain Broadcasting Regulations ensured that local and 
diverse voices serving radio’s public interest would remain competitive with media 
conglomerates entering the broadcast industry.  See supra text accompanying notes 74-
94. 
 85. Previous regulations prevented broadcasters from keeping economic pace with 
non-broadcast competitors.  While non-broadcast services like cable and satellite 
companies can earn revenue from advertising and subscriber fees, broadcasters depend 
solely on advertising.  Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286; 46,292 (Aug. 5, 
2003). 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 46293-94. 
 87. See Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1163-72; Prindle, supra note 24, at 302-19. 
 88. Unfettered by ownership caps, corporate media consolidation strove to cut 
costs and maximize subsidiary station profits.  For example, eliminating local news and 
public affairs in favor of syndicated, mass produced services boosts profit margins while 
robbing communities of specific, localized broadcasts.  See Howard, supra note 58, at 
279-80 (citing Mark Gimein, Groups Look to Cut Costs, Set the Pace, MEDIAWEEK, Sept. 
9, 1996, at MQ28.). 
A group station owner testifying before Congress admitted as much: “It’s commodity 
trading to us.  We don’t know [our] community.  We’re short-term players.”  142 CONG. 
REC. S6108 (daily ed. June 11, 1996) (alteration in original). 
 89. See infra Part III. 
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the traditional public interest in localism and diversity.90  Ex parte 
seizure permanently deprives listeners of these benefits. 
For an organization tasked with protecting radio diversity, a theory 
premised on removing barriers to maximize growth may not provide 
necessary safeguards to ensure variety.91  Although tight control of the 
airwaves developed radio into a diverse source of information and 
entertainment, deregulation has consolidated media ownership and 
decreased diversity.  While the FCC’s approach to radio regulation has 
completely reversed course,92 localism and diversity remain core goals.93  
 90. Id.  The homogenization of music radio typifies the lack of diversity wrought 
by deregulation.  As it becomes more difficult and expensive to introduce new product 
on the radio, the long-standing practice of payola has drawn more attention.  See Press 
Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Sony Settles Payola 
Investigation (July 25, 2005), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/jul/jul25a_05.html 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006).  For the music industry, deregulation is a vicious circle: as 
larger companies consolidate the airwaves, it becomes more expensive for diverse, non-
mainstream artists to get exposure, and only larger recording studios can afford to secure 
airtime.  Gradually, radio becomes a mouthpiece and profit generator among fewer and 
larger organizations.  The incentive for diversity has been replaced by an incentive to 
play guaranteed profit generators.  Judging by the growing popularity of niche satellite, 
Internet radio and podcasting, the public interest in new and diverse programming 
remains strong.  For example, XM Satellite Radio provides over 150 commercial free 
radio formats.  See XM Satellite Radio, Corporate Information, http://www.xmradio. 
com/corporate_info/corporate_information_main.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).  
Internet radio providers, like Yahoo!’s “Launchcast,” provide similar services which also 
let users customize radio stations to play their favorite artists.  The Internet service will 
also suggest new artists in the same genre as the user’s preferred artists.  Launchcast, 
http://www.launchcast. com (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).  One can extrapolate this point 
beyond radio as an entertainment medium.  An FCC report found that radio advertising 
rates have jumped over 90% since the 1996 deregulation.  See Williams & Roberts, 
supra note 80.  Not only can fewer large corporations afford to advertise their products, 
the rates have profound implications for grassroots public service organizations and local 
political figures who use radio to gather support.  Current FCC deregulation fails this 
core diversity function, and stations fulfilling a diversity interest should not be priced out 
of the spectrum. 
 91. Indeed, such trust that large corporations will best serve the public interest 
seems increasingly dubious in light of the following quote from Clear Channel 
Communications CEO Lowry Mays: “If anyone said we were in the radio business, it 
wouldn’t be someone from our company.  We’re not in the business of providing news 
and information.  We’re not in the business of providing well-researched music.  We’re 
simply in the business of selling our customers products.”  Alexander Lynch, US: The 
Media Lobby, CORPWATCH, Mar. 11, 2005, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=11947 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2006). 
 92. FCC Chairman Michael Powell observed during the 2003 deregulation that 
“the market is my religion.”  William Safire, On Media Giantism, supra note 80, at A19. 
 93. William Kennard stressed the FCC’s continuing commitments to localism and 
diversity when introducing the new LPFM regulations.  See Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1168. 




Emphasizing “public interest” through profit-driven private choice, current 
FCC rhetoric is also different from the original legislative intent.94
Absent a showing of interference, enforcing licensing requirements 
with ex parte seizure conflicts with a regulatory scheme premised on 
privately driven marketplace theory.  Under the old public trust model, 
ex parte seizure may have been appropriate to preserve the regulatory 
scheme, further public confidence in radio development, and dissuade 
amateur pirates from stumbling on adjacent frequencies.  Because FCC 
authority required broadcasters to meet goals and serve the listening 
public, operating in defiance of these responsibilities constituted a public 
harm in itself.95  However, since the shift to marketplace theory, private 
interests have replaced government regulation in areas like licensing and 
programming.96  In other words, private competition better serves listener 
 94. As a sponsor of the bill enacted as the Radio Act of 1927, Congressman 
White’s comments reflect a communal approach to regulation: 
We have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all our people to 
enjoy this means of communication can be preserved only by the repudiation 
of the idea underlying the 1912 law that anyone who will may transmit and by 
the assertion in its stead of the doctrine that the right of the public to service is 
superior to the right of any individual . . . .  The recent radio conference met 
this issue squarely.  It recognized that in the present state of scientific 
development there must be a limitation upon the number of broadcasting 
stations and it recommended that licenses should be issued only to those 
stations whose operation would render a benefit to the public, are necessary in 
the public interest, or would contribute to the development of the art.  This 
principle was approved by every witness before your committee.  We have 
written it into the bill.  If enacted into law, the broadcasting privilege will not 
be a right of selfishness.  It will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be 
served. 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 n.5 (1969) (citing 67 CONG. REC. 5479).   
According to the District of Columbia Circuit in KFKB Broadcasting Ass’n v. Federal 
Radio Commission, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931): 
In its Second Annual Report (1928), p. 169, the commission cautioned 
broadcasters “who consume much of the valuable time allotted to them under 
their licenses in matters of a distinctly private nature which are not only 
uninteresting, but also distasteful to the listening public.”  When Congress 
provided that the question whether a license should be issued or renewed 
should be dependent upon a finding of public interest, convenience, or 
necessity, it very evidently had in mind that broadcasting should not be a mere 
adjunct of a particular business but should be of a public character.  Obviously, 
there is no room in the broadcast band for every business or school of thought. 
 95. See KFKB Broad. Ass’n, 47 F.2d at 672 (implying a paramount public right to 
a well-regulated spectrum). 
 96. For example, private competition drives the FCC’s auctioning scheme.  See 
supra note 79.  The fairness doctrine has also been abandoned, meaning that private 
broadcasters no longer face a strict government-ordered programming requirement.  See 
supra note 45.  At the high water mark in 1960, an FCC Program Policy Statement 
identified fourteen major elements usually necessary to meet the public interest.  Martin, 
supra note 27, at 1177 (citing FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, NETWORK 
PROGRAMMING INQUIRY: REPORT & STATEMENT OF POLICY, 25 FED. REG. 7291, 7295 
(1960).  Licenses would not be awarded unless an applicant’s programming reflected the 
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interests than does a public trust regulatory scheme.  There is no reason 
license enforcement should not follow suit.  Without interference, there 
is no private harm.  Everyone who wishes to be heard is heard.  Indeed, 
using ex parte seizure to silence pirates cuts against the FCC’s traditional 
competition component defining public interest.  Theoretically, non-
interfering pirate broadcasters should compete for market share and push 
other broadcasters to refine their services, thus advancing the industry as 
a whole. 
Parties seeking ex parte enforcement in other privately regulated 
industries must meet a considerably higher bar.  For example, a trademark 
owner wanting to seize counterfeit goods needs to establish irreparable 
harm and a likelihood of success on the merits.97  In the absence of 
interference, the FCC would have a tough time meeting the “irreparable 
harm” prong.  Before courts authorize ex parte seizure, requiring interference 
would demonstrate a private “harm” necessitating a powerful administrative 
remedy. 
III.  NEW REGULATORY PHILOSOPHIES REQUIRE                                       
NEW SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  The FCC and LPFM: On Again, Off Again 
Lacking funds needed to acquire expensive licenses and high power 
equipment, non-interfering pirate radio operators usually operate “Low 
Power FM” (LPFM) stations.  Typically, this means operating at less 
than 100 watts, or within a ten to twelve mile radius.98  Practicality and 
ideology work in tandem: the low cost of operation and community-
focused message provide economical, diverse alternatives to big market 
media.99  LPFM affordability furthers diversity by allowing more people 
to access the broadcast spectrum.  Due to LPFM’s limited range, more 
broadcasters can operate locally without interference. 
“tastes, needs, and desires of the community.”  Id. at 1178 (citing Krasnow & Goodman 
supra note 41, at 616). 
 97. Lucas G. Paglia & Mark A. Rush, End Game: The Ex Parte Seizure Process 
and the Battle Against Bootleggers, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 5, 8 (2002). 
 98. Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1133.  One wholesale exception to FCC licensing 
requirements applies to stations operating with a field strength not exceeding 250 
microvolts per meter at three meters.  47 C.F.R. § 15.239(b) (2005).  This limits 
unlicensed radio broadcasts to a two-block radius, too weak for effective community 
broadcasting service.  United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004, 1005 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 99. See Dorothy Kidd, Micro-Powered Radio, WHOLE EARTH, Spring 2000, at 87. 




Early FCC regulations permitting LPFM shared policies similar to 
those accompanying regulations restricting network ownership: listeners 
were best served by a variety of diverse, local voices.100  The FCC made 
LPFM attractive to amateur operators by waiving certain laborious 
reporting and identification requirements.  In 1978, however, the FCC 
revoked the ability to apply for a low power radio license.101  In a policy 
shift presaging marketplace theory, the FCC determined that high power 
FM stations could use the radio channels more efficiently by “serv[ing] 
larger areas, and bring[ing] effective noncommercial educational radio 
service to many who . . . lack[ed] it.”102  Operating a radio station under 
100 watts became illegal overnight, regardless of whether the station 
posed an interference threat.  While the FCC suggested that low power 
radio stations (expensively)103 increase wattage to obtain a commercial 
license, many low power radio operators kept broadcasting in defiance 
of FCC regulations.104  Aside from a few grandfathered exceptions, this 
class of previously licensed broadcasters became pirate radio operators 
overnight.  From an interference and safety perspective, nothing about 
LPFM broadcasts had changed except formal FCC approval. 
Despite the FCC’s considerable enforcement efforts,105 the number of 
illegal LPFM operators increased106 in relation to media consolidation.107  
In the years following the 1996 regulatory changes, the FCC shut down, 
on average, more than a dozen pirate radio operators each month.108  
Despite the risks, pirate radio operators continued broadcasting in 
response to deregulation’s effects on localism and diversity.109  The fact 
that LPFM stations’ eclectic formats drew enthusiastic local audiences 
vindicated the traditional public interest diversity function. 
 100. See generally Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
 101. See In re Changes in the Rules Relating to Noncommercial Educ. FM Broad. 
Stations, 69 F.C.C.2d 240, 244-51 (1978). 
 102. Id. at 248. 
 103. Aguilar, supra note 13, at 1168 (“Launching a high powered radio station costs 
at least $100,000 in FCC licensing fees and engineering studies.”). 
 104. Ruggiero, 317 F.3d at 241. 
 105. See id.  The FCC has four options when dealing with an unlicensed 
broadcaster: (1) seek an injunction to stop the unlicensed broadcasting, 47 U.S.C. § 
401(b) (2000); (2) issue a cease and desist order, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (2000); (3) impose a 
monetary forfeiture, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000); or (4) institute an in rem forfeiture, 47 
U.S.C. § 510 (2000). 
 106. Ruggiero, 317 F.3d at 241-42. 
 107. See Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14. 
 108. Ruggiero, 317 F.3d at 242 (citing FCC’s Low Power FM: A Review of the 
FCC’s Spectrum Management Responsibilities: Hearing on H.R. 3439 Before the 
Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on 
Commerce, 106th Cong. 85 (2000)). 
 109. Paul Riismandel, Radio with a Conscience: Community Radio in the Late ‘90s 
(1999), http://www.mediageek.org/rfc/Revue1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
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The FCC finally acknowledged deregulation’s adverse effects on 
localism and diversity by recognizing that LPFM broadcasters operated 
to fill a void.  In 1999, after inviting public comment,110 two new classes 
of LPFM stations were proposed.111  Reconfirming LPFM’s value, the 
FCC proposal emphasized public interest goals112 and admitted deregulation’s 
failure to properly support community broadcasting.113  Offering current 
pirates amnesty, the pirate operator needed to certify that they stopped 
broadcasting within twenty-four hours of being told to do so by the FCC 
and no later than a deadline listed in the proposed rules.114  This proposal 
provided a chance for pirate radio operators to legally preserve their 
commitments to localism and diversity. 
Fearing legitimized competition, the National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB) lobbied heavily against the FCC findings and 
proposed rules.115  Congress quickly superseded the FCC by enacting the 
Radio Broadcast Preservation Act of 2000 (RBPA).116  Essentially, this 
closed the door on current and former pirate radio broadcasters by 
“prohibiting any applicant from obtaining a low-power FM license if the 
applicant has engaged in any manner in the unlicensed operation of any 
station in violation of § 301117 of the Communications Act of 1934.”118  
 110. In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 14 F.C.C.R. 2471, ¶ 65 (1999). 
 111. In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, ¶ 11 (2000). 
 112. Id. at 2210-13. 
 113. Martin, supra note 27, at 1192 (citing Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 
15 F.C.C.R. at 2213. 
 114. Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. at ¶¶ 53-54. 
 115. Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14.  The NAB is the main lobby group of 
free, over-the-air radio and television broadcasters.  The National Association of 
Broadcasters, About NAB, http://www.nab.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2006). 
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2000 alone, the parent 
companies of the big five television and cable broadcasters (ABC, CBS, NBC, 
CNN and Fox) spent close to $27 million on lobbying firms. And that excludes 
the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) which spent $5.7 million the 
same year. According to the Center for Public Integrity, from 1998 until 2003, 
when the Federal Communications Commission considered another round of 
“relaxing” ownership regulations, “the lobbying expenditures by the broadcast 
industry ha[d] risen 74 percent.” 
Alexander Lynch, US: The Media Lobby, supra note 91.  For additional examples, Clear 
Channel spent only $12,000 on lobbying in 2001.  By the time of the 2003 rule change, 
this had risen over 19,000% to $2.28 million.  Id. 
 116. Radio Broadcast Preservation Act of 2000 (RBPA), Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 
Stat. 2762, § 632. 
 117. Section 301 provides for the ownership of radio channels by the United States 
government and requires a license for anyone wishing to transmit over the channels.  47 
U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 




That is, all low-power pirates were barred from obtaining a new LPFM 
license regardless of whether or when they had ceased to operate 
unlawfully.119  Responding to Congress, the FCC duly modified the 
proposed rules to include the stringent requirements,120 and the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals has since upheld the limitation against 
attack.121
B.  Non-Interfering LPFM Continues to Fulfill                             
Supreme Court “Public Interest” Policy 
While FCC policy shifted from public trust to marketplace theory, the 
Supreme Court steadfastly advocated a “marketplace of ideas” approach 
to spectrum regulation.122  This marketplace of ideas doctrine embraced 
wide varieties of competing voices to further the listener’s First 
Amendment interests.123  Competing voices furthered democracy, where 
“truth [would] ultimately prevail.”124  Like early FCC regulations, the 
Court also valued local broadcasters’ positive effects on the community.125  
 118. Radio Broadcast Preservation Act of 2000, § 632(a)(1)(B). 
 119. Ruggiero v. FCC, 317 F.3d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 120. Id.; In re Creation of Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. 2205, 2230 (2000), 
as amended by 16 F.C.C.R. 8026, ¶¶ 10-11 (2001).  The adopted regulations place heavy 
burdens on non-pirate operators, too.  “[B]y requiring a separation of three channels 
between new LPFC stations and existing broadcasters, Congress and the FCC prevented 
the creation of LPFM stations in most major markets, where the station’s small 
broadcasting range could reach the largest audiences.”  Perzanowski, supra note 76, at 
762. 
 121. See, e.g., Ruggiero, 317 F.3d 239. 
 122. In 1969, the Supreme Court in Red Lion best summarized this approach: 
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their 
collective right to have the medium function consistently with ends and 
purposes of the First Amendment.  It is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.  It is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which 
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that 
market, whether it by the Government itself or a private licensee. . . .  It is the 
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral 
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.  That right may not 
constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC. 
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. at 390. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Throughout his NBC opinion, Justice Frankfurter carefully credited the Report 
on Chain Broadcasting rather than proposed any overt policy guidelines himself.  
However, he cited an earlier Supreme Court case stressing the public’s interest in local 
broadcasting: “An important element of public interest and convenience affecting the 
issue of a license is the ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service to the 
community reached by his broadcasts.”  Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 
216 (1943) (citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)).  This 
suggests that, at the time, the Supreme Court and FCC shared a commitment to localism 
best served by ownership regulation. 
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Because public trust regulations actively promoted variety,126 early FCC 
policy promoted the Court’s normative First Amendment view. 
Although rooted in similar philosophies, the FCC’s current marketplace 
theory conflicts with the Court’s marketplace of ideas.  Regulations 
emphasizing the public’s listening interests have been replaced with free 
market philosophies emphasizing the broadcasters’ profit potential.  In 
doing so, the First Amendment analysis has shifted from listener to 
broadcaster.127  As mentioned above, deregulation has resulted in media 
consolidation.  The marketplace of ideas has shrunk as listeners receive 
information from fewer sources.  While indicating less trust in the FCC’s 
“public interest” role,128 the Court still relies on the marketplace of ideas 
to promote freedom of expression.129  Current FCC doctrine, which 
constricts the marketplace, may inhibit the Court’s traditional First 
Amendment view of broadcast regulation.130
NBC still stands as the Court’s definitive holding on licensing and the 
First Amendment.  In NBC, the Court trusted the FCC to regulate 
broadcasting by emphasizing diversity over monopoly.131  Placing 
paramount importance in the public’s First Amendment “marketplace,” 
the NBC Court separated the broadcaster’s freedom of speech from the 
medium used for transmission.  To wit, the networks’ First Amendment 
arguments failed because “[t]he right of free speech does not include . . . 
the right to use the facilities of radio without a license.”132
 126. See supra notes 71-73. 
 127. The NBC Court upheld regulations from a broadcaster’s First Amendment 
attack premised on an argument that the listener’s First Amendment interests would 
suffer.  Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 225-27.  Unlike NBC, courts increasingly require 
greater FCC justifications for actions appearing to infringe on broadcaster’s First 
Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1047 
(D.C. Cir. 2002).  The Fox Television court called an FCC decision “arbitrary and 
capricious and contrary to law” because the FCC failed to give adequate reasons for its 
regulatory decisions.  Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Recent Court majorities reference the “marketplace of ideas.”  See, e.g., Reno 
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).  Although the Reno case deals with content-based 
Internet censuring, id. at 871-72, the core doctrine is consistent with Red Lion.  That is, 
the public’s First Amendment interest in the freedom of expression is furthered by an 
uninhibited exchange of ideas from a wide variety of viewpoints.  See id. at 884-85. 
 130. See Benjamin, supra note 41, at 54-65 (discussing current confusion over 
which level of scrutiny to apply to broadcast regulations). 
 131. See supra note 69. 
 132. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 190, 227. 




Although NBC precludes First Amendment challenges to ex parte seizure, 
the Court may want to reconsider NBC in light of recent developments.  
First, the Court reached the NBC decision under the old public trust 
model of FCC regulation.  While the Court’s First Amendment policy 
has remained constant, the regulatory policy has reversed.  Since 
marketplace theory focused on private interests, radio’s marketplace of 
ideas has shrunk.  Non-interfering pirate radio furthers Court policy by 
adding diverse and local voices back to the marketplace of ideas.  NBC 
should not deny First Amendment protection in an inapposite regulatory 
environment. 
Second, Congress’s refusal to follow FCC LPFM recommendations 
stands at odds with NBC’s “expert agency” deference.133  In countering 
concerns over freedom of speech abridgments, the NBC Court placed 
much trust in the FCC’s expert ability to regulate in the public interest.134  
The recent history surrounding the LPFM proposals indicated less faith 
from Congress.  Despite technical findings dismissing LPFM interference 
effects,135 Congress refused to accept regulations recognizing LPFM’s 
benefits.136  The FCC was then placed in the awkward position of enforcing 
technical policy contrary to published agency reports.137  Alternatively, 
the legislative action might reflect anti-competitive, marketplace-shrinking 
lobbying efforts of large private broadcasters.  Under either theory, the 
FCC may no longer be as uniquely competent or independent to regulate 
in the public interest.  Because broadcasters use the spectrum primarily 
for sending and receiving information, the Court may want to take a 
more active role protecting the free exchange of ideas.  Refining NBC 
would remove the FCC as sole First Amendment “gatekeeper” to the 
airwaves.  For example, requiring a showing of interference before denying 
Constitutional protection would help ensure that diverse broadcasters are 
not arbitrarily or invidiously kept from competing for listeners. 
 133. See id. at 215-20 (giving the FCC wide authority to promulgate regulations 
ordering the “fluid and dynamic” industry of radio). 
 134. See supra note 69. 
 135. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Lottery Today 
Determines Order for Accepting Applications for Low Power FM Radio Station 
Licenses (Mar. 27, 2000), 2000 WL 306359. 
 136. See id.; cf. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Chairman 
Urges Broadcasters to Shift Focus from Fighting Against Low Power Radio to Fighting 
for Digital Opportunities (Apr. 11, 2000), 2000 WL 369665 (addressing the likely source 
of congressional opposition to LPFM). 
 137. See, e.g., In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 15 F.C.C.R. 2205 (2000) 
(publishing findings and proposing rules ultimately overruled by Congress’s passage of 
the RBPA); In re Creation of a Low Power Radio Serv., 14 F.C.C.R. 2471 (1999). 
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Some critics argue that keeping spectrum idle violates the First 
Amendment.138  If one accepts this, non-interfering pirate broadcasters 
already have presumptive First Amendment rights.  Although the argument 
blurs the line between speech and the spectrum,139 these critics insist that 
the scarcity rationale only warrants broadcast restrictions that limit 
interference.140  Today, much commentary centers around the scarcity 
rationale’s continued viability141 and level of “scrutiny”142 FCC 
regulations should receive.  Should courts refine NBC or acknowledge a 
First Amendment interest, ex parte seizure to silence non-interfering 
pirate broadcasters would probably not pass Constitutional muster.  The 
next section turns to this analysis. 
IV.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND REASONABLE             
ALTERNATIVES TO EX PARTE SEIZURE 
A.  The Denial of Fort Wayne Protection 
The Fourth Amendment protects all citizens against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.143  In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana144 the 
Supreme Court recognized that ex parte seizures affecting First Amendment 
rights require greater scrutiny.145  Specifically, mere probable cause to 
believe that a law has been broken is not enough to remove certain 
speech from the public domain.146  By denying a First Amendment right, 
 138. See generally Benjamin, supra note 41 (arguing that FCC regulation should be 
limited to concerns about interference and stating that the scarcity rationale undercuts 
government restrictions on spectrum). 
 139. Id. at 32. 
 140. Id. at 65-77.  Of course, “independent” First Amendment rationales can always 
limit broadcasting; for example, the Court has upheld regulations on licensed 
broadcasters that restrict obscenity and indecency.  See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 141. See generally Benjamin, supra note 41. 
 142. Id. 
 143. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 144. 489 U.S. 46 (1989). 
 145. See id. at 63 (holding that “while the general rule under the Fourth Amendment 
is that any and all contraband . . . may be seized on probable cause (and even without a 
warrant in various circumstances), it is otherwise when materials presumptively 
protected by the First Amendment are involved.”); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 
468 (1985) (“The First Amendment imposes special constraints on searches for and 
seizures of presumptively protected material and requires that the Fourth Amendment be 
applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude’ in such circumstances.” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965)). 
 146. Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 62-67. 




NBC denies pirate operators heightened Fort Wayne protection against 
government intrusion. 
Developed over obscenity seizures, the principles supporting the Fort 
Wayne doctrine are not broad enough to cover pirate radio seizures.  
Fort Wayne emphasized concerns about the subjective nature of 
obscenity determinations and prior restraint.147  In other words, the fear 
of ex parte seizure chills the dissemination of protected speech.  Courts 
have held the doctrine inapplicable to objective measures of unlicensed 
radio transmission.148  Instead, courts relied on the regulatory backdrop 
denying licenses.149  They rightly held that determining obscenity carries 
a higher risk of subjective bias than measuring radio transmissions 
violating an objective regulatory threshold. 
Nonetheless, given recent lobbying concerns and the decrease in 
localism and diversity, courts may want to extend a Fort Wayne-like 
doctrine to non-interfering pirate broadcasters.  To do so, one must argue 
that the public’s interest for diversity and localism is akin to the private 
interest against prior restraint.  Given the Court’s views that both interests 
promote the freedom of expression and further liberty, a legitimate 
argument may exist on an abstract level.150  Once protected, ex parte 
seizures may not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” 
standard.  At any rate, alternate enforcement methods better fit the 
FCC’s current regulatory philosophy.  Therefore, choosing ex parte 
seizure over other enforcement methods requires greater scrutiny to 
ensure reasonableness. 
B.  Alternative Enforcement Choices and Obstacles                                   
Posed by Each One 
Given alternative methods of enforcement, ex parte seizures of non-
interfering broadcasting equipment may not be considered reasonable.  
Unlike an operator interfering with licensed transmissions, a non-
interfering broadcaster poses no immediate threat to the safety or 
interests of others.  The only people affected by the broadcast are voluntary 
listeners.  Without any immediate harm, the FCC could utilize three 
 147. Macon, 472 U.S. at 470. 
 148. U.S. v. Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 421-22 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 149. See United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(giving the FCC wide latitude in determining the constitutionality of their own licensing 
scheme). 
 150. For the public’s interest in localism and diversity furthering democracy, see 
supra Part III.B.  For holdings that discuss prior restraint’s negative affects on liberty, 
see Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (collecting cases). 
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additional safeguards.  Although less intrusive, none of the alternatives 
completely mitigate deregulation’s effects on diversity and localism. 
The first and least intrusive method is a “cease and desist” order.151  
Although the FCC generally provides warning of possible ex parte 
seizures,152 this notice does not follow the procedures for issuing a cease 
and desist order.153  Challenging cease and desist orders, however, 
involves practical difficulties: regardless of where pirate operators 
broadcast, cease and desist orders can only be appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.154
An injunction against station operation provides another less 
intrusive enforcement option.155  In fact, the FCC occasionally seeks 
an injunction against pirate radio operators rather than an ex parte 
seizure.156  At the very least, an injunctive hearing brings both parties 
before a district court to argue the merits of the injunction.  However, 
obstacles like the “primary jurisdiction doctrine” await pirate operators 
challenging the FCC’s basis for injunctive relief.  Specifically, the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine prevents pirate operators from raising 
First Amendment arguments in district courts157 until they exhaust 
administrative remedies.158
 151. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (2000) reads, in pertinent part: “Where any person (1) has 
failed to operate substantially as set forth in a license, (2) has violated or failed to 
observe any of the provisions of this chapter [that is, a provision requiring license to 
operate] . . . or (3) has violated or failed to observe any rule or regulation . . . the 
Commission may order such person to cease and desist from such action.” 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 218 
F.3d 543, 548 (6th Cir. 2000); Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14. 
 153. The cease and desist statute, 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000), must follow 47 U.S.C. 
§ 312(e) (2000).  Section 312(e) references U.S.C. § 558(c) (2000) (addressing license 
revocation) and extends its safeguards and opportunities to be heard to those receiving 
cease and desist orders.  The FCC notice, on the other hand, simply warns against 
unlicensed broadcasting and informs the recipient about possible fines and seizure.    
Importantly, the FCC notice provides a ten-day window for challenging the 
determination while a true cease and desist order must provide thirty days under 47 
U.S.C. § 312(c) (2000) before the issuance of such an order.   
 154. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(7) (2000). 
 155. 47 U.S.C. § 401(b) (2000). 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Neset, 235 F.3d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming 
an order granting an FCC request for injunctive relief); United States v. Dunifer, 219 
F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming a District Court injunction against a radio 
operator and denying that the District Court had authority to hear the operator’s 
affirmative defenses); Prayze FM v. FCC, 214 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming a 
District Court injunction against a radio operator). 
 157. Dunifer, 219 F.3d at 1006.  But see United States v. Any & All Radio Station 
Transmission Equip., 204 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Maquina Musical].  The 




While constantly evolving FCC policy affects the marketplace of 
ideas, the primary jurisdiction doctrine insulates the scheme from regular 
First Amendment challenges.  For example, when the FCC pursues 
injunctive relief against a pirate broadcaster, they pick the time and place 
to bring an action.  Defendant operators will usually not deny their 
unlicensed broadcasts; rather, they argue against the regulatory abridgment 
of First Amendment rights.159  Shielded from constitutional arguments, 
the district court generally grants the injunction and silences the pirate 
broadcaster.  As employed, the primary jurisdiction doctrine discriminates 
against smaller broadcasters.  When courts do analyze First Amendment 
arguments, they are presented from large private companies able to 
afford exhausting the administrative process.  Thus, the primary jurisdiction 
argument may chill regulatory challenges from local and diverse points 
of view. 
Levying forfeiture fines against unlicensed broadcasters may be the 
best enforcement option for today’s regulatory environment.160  Given 
marketplace theory and license auctioning, fining unlicensed broadcasters 
may maximize revenue from the broadcast spectrum. 
Forfeiture fines may also indirectly refine Supreme Court broadcast 
jurisprudence.  Like most FCC enforcement appeals, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia retains sole jurisdiction for broadcasters to 
contest levied fines.161  However, some courts do not employ the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine162 when the FCC uses local district courts to enforce 
fines.163  In other words, operators defending against a court-ordered fine 
may have standing to raise constitutional arguments.  If the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine does not apply, actions enforcing forfeiture fines 
would probably prompt regular First Amendment challenges from pirate 
operators.  Diverse, local broadcasters contesting fines would have more 
Macquina Musical case presumes proper district court jurisdiction over constitutional 
arguments.  However, courts now generally agree that constitutional defenses are 
precluded at the district court level on the basis of standing.  For an excellent discussion 
of the evolving primary jurisdiction argument in injunction and in rem forfeiture cases, 
see Prayze FM, 214 F.3d at 250-51, and Neset, 235 F.3d at 418-20. 
 158. Like cease and desist orders, exhausting administrative remedies is burdensome 
because it involves appealing license denials in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.  47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2000). 
 159. See, e.g., Dunifer, 219 F.3d at 1005 (arguing that denial of low power FM 
licenses abridged freedom of speech). 
 160. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000).  For most unlicensed broadcasters who have not 
applied for licenses, the fine accumulates at $10,000 per day with a cap at $75,000.  47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C) (2000). 
 161. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(A) incorporates 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000). 
 162. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 163. The FCC can enforce forfeitures through local district courts, which highlights 
discrepancies between FCC and pirate broadcaster ability to utilize local judicial 
resources.  47 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2000). 
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opportunities to make inroads against the NBC ruling.  However, 
because pirate broadcasters are modest in nature and because doing so 
might risk repeatedly defending on constitutional grounds, the FCC 
rarely uses monetary forfeiture as an enforcement tool.164
C.  Ex Parte Seizure: Using the Most Intrusive Enforcement Method for 
Non-Interfering Pirate Radio Is Unreasonable and Overbroad 
Although each enforcement mechanism places unique burdens on 
non-interfering pirate broadcasters, the alternatives are probably more 
reasonable than ex parte seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The 
enforcement statute broadly authorizes seizure of “[a]ny electronic, 
electromagnetic, radio frequency, or similar device, or component 
thereof . . . .”165  However, the Supreme Court has held that regulations 
interfering with the First Amendment must be “narrowly drawn” to serve 
those interests.166  This holding is important considering that streaming 
webcasts often accompany over-the-air pirate broadcasts. 
Applying the First Amendment to today’s new media formats, the 
authority to seize “any and all” electronic equipment is overbroad.  For 
example, FRSD streamed its live broadcast over the Internet in addition 
to over the airwaves.  When the FCC and U.S. Marshals seized “any and 
all” electronic equipment, they seized computers engaged in the dual use 
of broadcasting and webcasting.  Lacking equipment, FRSD has not yet 
returned to the Internet.167  Because of the enforcement statute’s 
overinclusiveness, the FCC silenced protected Internet speech in addition to 
enforcing broadcast regulations.  The statute could be narrowly drawn 
by authorizing the seizure of equipment used only in broadcasting, such 
as antennae or amplifiers.  Alternatively, the statute might be justified 
under exigent circumstances should it apply only upon a showing of 
interference. 
Ex parte forfeitures involve the greatest intrusions and provide the 
least protections for those whose property is at stake.  Since many pirate 
 164. But see, e.g., Grid Radio v. FCC, 278 F.3d 1314, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(imposing a monetary forfeiture, among other remedies).  Grid Radio is one of the few 
published cases to reflect an FCC forfeiture fine. 
 165. 47 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2000). 
 166. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980). 
 167. Though FRSD’s homepage at http://www.pirate969.org had not been offering 
streaming broadcasts as recently as October 2, 2005, that service is now available.  (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2006). 




radio stations operate from residences,168 courts should also consider the 
historically important “sanctity of the home”169 when approving the 
appropriateness of ex parte seizures.  The three additional congressional 
remedies provide less intrusive, albeit imperfect, means to pursue operators 
broadcasting without a license.  Should pirate broadcasters claim an 
additional First Amendment interest in webcasting, the ex parte seizure 
statute is not drawn narrowly enough to protect the freedom of speech.  
Therefore, in the absence of interference, the FCC should pursue less 
intrusive means to enforce licensing regulations. 
V.  PLEADING THE FIFTH: EX PARTE SEIZURES OF NON-INTERFERING 
PIRATE RADIO EQUIPMENT UNDER CURRENT                                             
SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE 
A.  Ex Parte Seizures of Non-Interfering Pirate Radio Conflict          
With the Supreme Court’s Mathews Test 
Most courts analyze a pirate radio operator’s Fifth Amendment Due 
Process concerns under the Supreme Court’s Mathews170 framework.171  
In Mathews, the Court emphasized the importance of predeprivation 
hearings and constructed a framework to analyze the constitutional 
sufficiency of prejudgment seizures.172  Specifically, courts are to 
consider three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the official 
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest in the 
procedures, including the administrative burdens that the additional 
procedural requirement would entail.173  The growing popularity of dual 
use webcasting equipment adds a twist to the first two factors and weighs 
against ex parte seizure for non-interfering pirate radio broadcasters. 
 168. FRSD broadcasted first from a house, and then from an apartment.  Tom 
Fudge Interview, supra note 14. 
 169. The Supreme Court has stated that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .”  United States v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 170. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 171. See, e.g., United States v. Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 
422-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  Technically, the ex parte enforcement statute, through the 
Supplemental Rules, authorizes a court clerk to issue an arrest warrant for seizing 
property without a showing of exigent circumstances: “When the United States files a 
complaint demanding a forfeiture for violation of a federal statute [like 47 U.S.C. § 301], 
the clerk must promptly issue a summons and a warrant for the arrest of the . . . property 
without requiring a certification of exigent circumstances. . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. C(3)(a)(i) 
(emphasis added). 
 172. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-35. 
 173. Id. 
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The private interest affected by ex parte seizure is substantial.  
Technically, two private interests may exist: a free speech interest and a 
property interest in radio equipment.  Courts typically dispose of the free 
speech interest by relying on NBC’s denial of First Amendment 
protection to those broadcasting without a license.174  However, 
presumptively protecting non-interfering broadcasts would turn the 
private interest into a constitutional right.175  Additionally, dual use 
equipment, such as computers, can be used to disseminate legal speech 
over the Internet.176  In the presence of dual use technology, the private 
First Amendment interest becomes greater. 
A private property interest necessarily attaches to expensive electronic 
equipment.  Even if unlicensed broadcasting falls outside First Amendment 
protection, broadcasting equipment itself is not inherently unlawful.  For 
example, if a court granted an injunction against a pirate operator, the 
operator could legally sell his transmitter to a licensed individual.  
Moreover, dual use equipment, such as computers, may be seized 
although the involvement in pirate radio may be minimal.  Arguably, a 
strong property interest exists in equipment which either could be legally 
used should the owner take steps to get a license or sold to a broadcaster 
licensed to use it. 
The second Matthews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, cuts 
decidedly against pirate broadcasters.  Specifically, the risk of erroneously 
seizing broadcasting equipment is low.  The FCC maintains sophisticated 
tracking equipment and broadcasters typically admit to broadcasting 
without a license.177  However, as dual use technology becomes more 
widespread, pre-seizure hearings could provide additional safeguards 
 174. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) (holding that 
“[t]he right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of 
radio without a license.”); see also Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 422 
(denying that claimants had any First Amendment interest in broadcasting without a 
license). 
 175. Courts emphasize the importance of First Amendment rights in the due process 
context.  See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“Freedom of speech . . . [is] 
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process 
clause . . . .”); Grove Press Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 90 (3d Cir. 1969) 
(holding that procedure inhibiting expression as the result of an ex parte hearing violates 
the Due Process Clause). 
 176. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (striking down a law 
regulating content on the Internet). 
 177. See, e.g., United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 218 
F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2000); Any & All Radio Station Equip, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 418 
(denying any violation of the licensing statute). 




over ex parte forfeitures.  For example, when the FCC conducts a 
prejudgment raid on a structure that includes dual use equipment, the 
risk of seizing electronic equipment unrelated to broadcasting increases.  
A pirate operator broadcasting simultaneously over the air and Internet 
could benefit from a pre-seizure hearing by identifying the use of his 
webcasting equipment.  Pursuing an injunction against a pirate broadcaster 
would have the same effect.  Faced with an order to stop broadcasting, 
the operator may prefer to stop radio transmission rather than risk 
additional “cyber-silence” through seizure of dual-use equipment. 
The third and most contested factor concerns the government’s 
interest in obtaining an ex parte seizure.  The Supreme Court in Fuentes 
v. Shevin178 required exigent circumstances to justify the government’s 
ex parte seizures, and courts look examine three factors to decide 
whether exigent circumstances exist:179 (1) whether seizure is necessary 
to secure an important governmental or public interest; (2) the necessity 
of very prompt action; and (3) whether a government official initiates 
the seizure by applying the standards of a narrowly drawn statute.180
The first Fuentes factor cuts for and against the government.  Although 
the government has always had a great interest in furthering the utility of 
radio, marketplace theory has replaced many regulations with private 
choice.181  As such, the public interest in prejudgment seizure is less 
clear.  If one accepts the idea that non-interfering pirate broadcasters 
fulfill core values of diversity and localism,182 public interest requires a 
preseizure hearing to ensure a neutral party determines the seizure’s 
necessity.  Additionally, an ex parte seizure may not be “necessary” 
considering other enforcement options.183  Insulating a non-interfering 
pirate operator with presumptive First Amendment protection further 
weakens the government interest in silencing broadcasters.  As Part II 
suggests, government withdrawal from spectrum regulation should 
correspondingly decrease the intrusiveness of license enforcement. 
In the absence of interference, very prompt action is rarely necessary 
to pursue unlicensed broadcasters.  For example, FRSD operated for 
over two years without complaint before the FCC executed an in rem 
seizure.184  Another station operating without interference, Free Radio 
 178. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
 179. See, e.g., Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 423-24 (citing 
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 92; United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, 971 F.2d 
896, 903 (2d. Cir. 1992)). 
 180. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91. 
 181. See supra Part III.B. 
 182. See supra note 122. 
 183. The FCC has three options besides ex parte civil forfeiture to deal with an 
unlicensed broadcaster.  See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 184. Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, supra note 1. 
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Santa Cruz, operated for almost ten years before the FCC initiated an ex 
parte seizure.185  In the case of FRSD, the FCC knew about the station 
for months, including the broadcasting location.186  Because the unlicensed 
broadcasting did not create any immediate harm, rapid enforcement was 
not forthcoming.  In other words, exigent circumstances requiring fast, 
intrusive remedies did not exist.  A showing of interference would justify an 
ex parte seizure and vindicate the public interest in receiving intelligible, 
licensed broadcasts.187  However, lacking interference, the need for very 
prompt action falls away.  The remaining enforcement options still 
provide enough “teeth” to preserve the integrity of the FCC’s regulatory 
mandate. 
The FCC enforcement statute broadly authorizing seizure of any and 
all electronic equipment188 has been eclipsed by marketplace theory and 
dual use technology.189  A broad statute might have been a suitable 
punishment for enforcing heavy responsibilities under the public trust 
model.  However, non-interfering pirate broadcasters pose no immediate 
threats to the private parties driving the current regulatory scheme.190  
The concerns about dual use technology addressed in Part IV apply 
equally here. 
A statute limiting seizure to “broadcasting equipment” upon a “showing 
of interference” would probably satisfy Fuentes’s “narrowly drawn” 
requirement.  This would ensure that only operators committing immediate 
private harms created exigencies justifying prejudgment seizure.  Although 
the public interest factor favors both parties, the interests of a non-
interfering pirate operator trump governmental interests regarding necessity 
of prompt action and a narrowly drawn statute.  Therefore, exigent 
circumstances generally do not exist in ex parte seizures of non-interfering 
 185. Interview by Juan Gonzalez & Amy Goodman with George Cadman & Vinny 
Lombardo, in Santa Cruz, California (Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www. 
democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=04/09/30/1411235#transcript (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). 
 186. Tom Fudge Interview, supra note 14. 
 187. See United States v. Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d 414, 424 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 188. See 47 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2000). 
 189. But see Any & All Radio Station Equip., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (holding that the 
licensing statute, 47 U.S.C. § 301, is narrowly drawn enough to initiate a seizure).  This 
Author respectfully disagrees.  While § 301 holds that operators may not broadcast 
without a license, 47 U.S.C. § 510(a) is the statute authorizing ex parte seizures.  It is 
argued that the FCC applies this statute when effectuating a seizure. 
 190. The only threat to private parties is competition, a goal that FCC policy 
traditionally promotes. 




radio equipment.  And in the absence of exigent circumstances, courts 
generally disfavor ex parte seizures.191
B.  Traditional Government Justification of Ex parte Seizures Is Flawed 
Typically, the government argues the adequacy of ex parte pirate radio 
seizures by pointing to the forfeiture in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht 
Leasing Co.192  In Calero-Toledo, a drug smuggling case, the government 
seized a yacht prior to judicial determination of forfeiture.193  Central to 
the Court’s analysis was the fact that a yacht was the sort of property 
that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed if 
advance warning of confiscation were given.194  However, the concerns 
underlying drug cases are inapplicable to that of non-interfering pirate 
radio seizures.195  Whereas the government has reason to fear drug smuggling 
instruments fleeing jurisdiction, individual pirate radio stations only 
exist and thrive in the immediate area.  Because most pirate broadcasters 
operate low power stations, fleeing the jurisdiction would mean fleeing 
their supporting audience.  Although seizing the instrumentalities of the 
drug trade provides immediate benefits to the public interest,196 the only 
people affected by non-interfering pirate radio are those voluntarily 
listening to the broadcast.  No immediate public interest is furthered by 
 191. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53-55 
(1993) (“We tolerate some exceptions to the general rule requiring predeprivation notice 
and hearing, but only in ‘extraordinary situations where some valid government interest 
is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.’” (quoting Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972))).  The Court continued its analysis by describing the 
lack of protection an ex parte seizure leaves the owner of property.  Id. at 55. 
 192. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
 193. Id. at 664. 
 194. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. at 52 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 
U.S. at 679). 
 195. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679. 
Thus, for example, due process is not denied when postponement of notice and 
hearing is necessary to protect the public from contaminated food; from a bank 
failure; or from misbranded drugs. 
  The considerations that justified postponement of notice and hearing in 
[the aforementioned situations] are present here. . . .  [S]eizure under the . . . 
statutes serves significant governmental purposes: Seizure . . . foster[s] the 
public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted).  Unlike non-interfering pirate radio, each of the mentioned items 
can cause immediate public harm. 
 196. For example, taking a drug boat into custody theoretically reduces the amount 
of drugs coming into a community.  This increases the community’s well-being, 
regardless if they were pro-drug or anti-drug, through lower crime and greater resources 
available for other projects.  On the other hand, ex parte pirate radio seizures do not 
provide any offsetting benefits, other than a vague respect for FCC enforcement 
measures.  Ex parte seizures directly harm the listening audience, however, by depriving 
them of a source of local and diverse broadcasters. 
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seizing non-interfering broadcasting equipment.  Indeed, silencing pirate 
broadcasts through ex parte seizure may contradict the FCC’s public 
interest mandate.197
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Today, the radio industry has developed from a little-understood 
novelty to a multibillion dollar industry.  Radios are in our homes, cars, 
clocks, and showers.  Many of us listen to the daily news on the drive to 
work and blast music on the ride home.  No matter where and when we 
listen, we depend on radio as a free source of information and entertainment.  
As the regulating body, the FCC enjoys significant influence on what 
comes out of the little box with knobs. 
While early FCC policy commanded choice over efficiency, marketplace 
theory promotes an opposite incentive.  Pirate operators and their audiences 
argue that the policy shift harms the public’s interest in local and diverse 
programming.  The strength of this argument lies in the pirate-public 
relationship: despite substantial personal risk, pirate stations continue to 
operate with strong public support.  And without any private harm, they 
argue, the only “harm” in unlicensed broadcasting is competition.  Ex 
parte seizure disproportionately affects the smallest and most diverse 
voices on the spectrum; perhaps, these voices need the most protection 
today. 
The effects of marketplace theory are at odds with the traditional 
Supreme Court approach to broadcast regulation.  The Court should 
either refine NBC’s holding or reaffirm the central tenets under arguments 
reflecting the realities of the current regulatory scheme.  Relaxing the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine would also promote more discussion on 
how the changed environment affects the way we use radio to further the 
First Amendment. 
Ex parte seizure is a powerful tool used to remedy great public harms 
and immediate private harms.  Given alternative enforcement methods, 
less intrusive remedies can still maintain the spectrum’s integrity.  
Additionally, non-interfering pirate radio does not pose the inherent 
exigencies that warrant ex parte relief. 
Finally, the emergence of dual use technology poses a problem with 
which courts have not yet dealt.  As we have seen, webcasting may 
 197. See supra Part III. 




significantly alter the balance of interests under Mathews.  Ex parte 
seizure is an enforcement remedy which may hurt more than it helps. 
VII.  AFTERWORD 
As this Comment neared completion, the Author regularly checked the 
FRSD Web site for updates on the station’s response to the FCC seizure.  
As an indication of how strongly the community valued FRSD’s service, 
listener donations allowed the station to resume unlicensed, interference-
free broadcasting within three months of the ex parte raid.  On 
November 21, 2005, Bob Ugly reaffirmed his own commitment by 
posting the following on FRSD’s Web site: “on a personal note to the 
San Diego FCC, we roll much deeper than you.  Take our [expletive] 
again, and we’ll only clown you even harder when we come back.”198
BUCK ENDEMANN 
 
 198. Free Radio San Diego 96.9FM, http://www.pirate969.org/modules.php?name= 
News&file=article&sid=43 (November 22, 2005, 21:06:27 PST). 
